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This paper examines how electoral motives and government ideology influence ac-
tive labor market policies (ALMP). We present a model that explains how politi-
cians strategically use ALMP to generate political cycles in unemployment and the
budget deficit. Election-motivated politicians increase ALMP spending before elec-
tions irrespective of their party ideology. Leftwing politicians spend more on ALMP
than rightwing politicians. We test the hypotheses derived from our model using Ger-
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1 Introduction
Active labour market policies (ALMP) are a popular policy instrument in the arsenal of em-
ployment policy. In many European countries, governments have implemented several ALMP
programs and have spent a great deal of money on these programs. The success of ALMP
programs is, however, ambiguous. Empirical studies suggest that many ALMP programs
have been quite ineffective. Country studies also suggest that the success of these programs
varies across countries. In Switzerland and Germany, for example, ALMP programs did not
shorten unemployment duration (Hagen and Steiner 2000, Lalive et al. 2008). In Poland,
training programs have increased the probability of individual employment, whereas wage
subsidies have had a negative influence on individual employment probability (Kluve et al.
2008). In Denmark, private and public job training as well as classroom job training have
had positive employment and earnings effects (Jespersen et al. 2008). A meta analysis for
European ALMP shows that the program type plays a significant role on program effective-
ness. Direct employment programs in the public sector do not appear to have a positive
influence on post-program employment rates, whereas wage subsidies appear to be more
effective (Kluve 2010). Against this background of limited success, an intriguing question
is why politicians have implemented ALMP programs for such a long time. We will there-
fore investigate whether political economic determinants, in particular electoral motives and
government ideology, have influenced ALMP.
The political business cycle theory (PBC) and partisan cycle theory (PT) seek to explain
how electoral motives and government ideology influence economic policy-making. PBC the-
ory concentrates on politicians facing a short-run Phillips curve trade-off between unemploy-
ment and inflation (e.g., Nordhaus 1975, Rogoff 1990, Shi and Svensson 2006). Incumbents
boost economic activity and reduce unemployment before elections in order to increase their
re-election prospects. The partisan approach focuses on the role of party ideology and shows
to what extent leftwing and rightwing politicians will provide policies that reflect the pref-
erences of their partisans. Leftist parties traditionally appeal more to the labor base and
promote expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, whereas rightwing parties appeal more
to capital owners, and are therefore more concerned with reducing inflation (Hibbs 1977,
Alesina 1987). Some attempts have been made to combine the two strands of literature, as
politicians may plausibly be motivated by both opportunistic and partisan considerations.
For example, an incumbent has strong incentives to take opinion polls into account: at times
when he is popular, he may implement his favorite partisan politics, whereas he may engage
in opportunistic behavior to increase his re-election chances if opinion polls become suffi-
ciently unfavorable (Frey and Schneider 1978a, 1978b, Sieg 2006). To be sure, governments
often do not have any influence on monetary policy. However, unemployment figures can
be influenced directly via ALMP even by local governments. Formal models explaining the
influence of electoral motives and government ideology on ALMP do not yet exist.
This paper examines how electoral motives and government ideology influence ALMP.
We present a model that explains how politicians strategically use ALMP to generate polit-
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ical cycles in unemployment and the budget deficit. Election-motivated politicians increase
ALMP spending before elections irrespective of their party ideology. Leftwing politicians
spend more on ALMP than rightwing politicians. We test the hypotheses derived from our
model using German state data from 1985:1 to 2004:11. The results suggest that ALMP
(job-creation schemes) were pushed before elections.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model. We analyze
the optimization problem of the competing political parties and show that political cycles
occur because of different party preferences and election dates. In section 3, we examine our
hypotheses using German data. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Players and basic setup
Consider an incumbent i who is either a member of a rightwing party R or a leftwing party
L, an opponent o who is a member of the other party (i, o = L,R and i 6= o), and a mass
of voters normalized to 1. The incumbent can implement ALMP measures. To stress the
importance of ALMP, we neglect other conducts of government spending and assume that
the government budget is balanced if no active labor market policy is implemented.
The unemployment rate ut in period t depends on the natural rate of unemployment un
and the expenditures on ALMP. For analytical convenience, we disregard all other determi-
nants of unemployment, such as overall macroeconomic performance or structural reforms,
in order to outline the effects of ALMP. The unemployment rate in period t is given as:
ut = un − β · bt (1)
with exogenous β > 0 and ALMP expenditures bt. The government can thus decrease the
unemployment rate via ALMP. The underlying mechanism is simple: the government creates
jobs by subsidizing employment. On the one hand, the implementation of ALMP therefore
increases the budget deficit because ALMP cause costs and usually do not generate addi-
tional revenues.1 On the other hand, unemployment falls, and the government faces a clear
trade-off between a larger government budget deficit and lower unemployment. Individuals
are heterogeneous with respect to their individual risk of becoming unemployed. All individ-
uals are unemployment averse and take current unemployment into account when deciding
whether to re-elect the incumbent or to vote for the opponent.2 Unemployment as the major
economic driving force of government’s popularity is well supported by empirical research
1Even if a job-creation measure generated additional revenues in the period of its implementation, these
would certainly not exceed the expenditure required to create the measure.
2This assumption corresponds to the empirical fact that unemployment is the most important political
topic in almost every industrialized country. 88% of the voters mentioned “unemployment” when asked
what (in their opinion) the most important political problems were on the day of the election to the German
Bundestag in 2005 (infratest dimap 2005).
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on vote/popularity functions (see, e.g., Mueller 2003, Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). In ad-
dition, voters are in general little informed about the state of the (macro)economy (see, e.g.,
Caplan 2007, p. 80ff). They usually have no clue about the extent of budget deficit. Empir-
ical evidence suggests, however, that most voters can provide a reasonable ball-park of the
estimate of the unemployment rate (see, e.g., Conover et al. 1986, Paldam and Nannestad
2000, Davidson et al. 2010).
We assume a voter-specific critical level of unemployment ucj(µ, ej) that determines voters
j‘s voting decision. Observing on election day an unemployment rate ut ≤ u
c
j(µ, ej), the
individual votes for the incumbent, otherwise for the opponent. We assume ucj(µ, ej) to
depend on two components. First, ucj(µ, ej) varies negatively with the individual risk of
becoming unemployed ej , ej ∈ [0, 1], i.e.:
∂uc
j
∂ej
< 0. Second, ucj increases with the incumbent’s
overall popularity µt, i.e. µt ∈ [µ, µ]:
∂ucj
∂µt
> 0 ∀ j ∈ [0, 1]. The individual risk of being
unemployed may vary across regions and may depend on voters education, etc. The variable
µt measures a component of the incumbent’s overall popularity which does not depend on
unemployment. We also assume ucj(µ, 1) > 0 and u
c
j(µ, 0) < 1 to hold. At a sufficiently
low level of unemployment, even the individual who is affected first by unemployment will
re-elect the incumbent, and, even the individual who is affected least by unemployment will
vote against the incumbent at a sufficiently high rate of unemployment. Individuals are,
hence, assumed to be self-interested and sociotropic, meaning that they are concerned about
their own and their countries’ economic circumstances. Empirical studies (see, e.g., Mueller
2003, Davidson et al. 2010) support the assumed voting behavior. The assumed voting
behavior implicitly assumes that voters have a short memory and behave myopically. The
assumption of retrospective voting behavior is supported by empirical evidence, whereas the
empirical evidence concerning the length of time relevant for individuals’ voting decision is
mixed. In any event, the assumed voting behavior is well established in the literature on
vote/popularity functions (see, e.g., Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000).
Figure 1 summarizes the crucial assumption regarding voting behavior. The voters are
lined up according to their ej . For a given unemployment rate ut, every individual with
ej < e˜ votes for the incumbent. Depending on the distribution of ej , the incumbent is either
re-elected or voted out of office.
The probability of an incumbent of party i being re-elected by the median voter is
p = p(ut(bt), µt), p ∈ (0, 1), with
∂p
∂ut
< 0 (and hence ∂p
∂bt
> 0).
2.2 The game
We analyze the incumbent’s behavior in a 2 period model. At the beginning of period t, the
incumbent decides about ALMP expenditures. Afterwards, the median voter chooses either
to vote for the incumbent or the opponent, depending on ut and µt. The winner sets ALMP
expenditures in t+ 1. The government budget is bounded in the sense that the government
is obliged to finance deficits via taxes according to an intertemporal budget function. A
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lump-sum tax is implemented to finance the present value of the cumulated deficit in period
t + 1. Thus, τt+1 = bt(1 + i) + bt+1 holds with total tax revenues τt+1 and interest rate i.
Since the probability that the median voter votes for the incumbent in period t does not
depend on actions in t+ 1, we can solve the optimization problem starting in period t.
Following the suggestions by Frey and Schneider (1978a, 1978b) and Sieg (2006), we
combine partisan and opportunistic motives in the incumbent’s indirect utility function.
Incumbents are assumed to dislike unemployment. Furthermore, they receive an ego rent
from being in office. In line with the literature on PBC and PT, the incumbent’s indirect
utility function in period t+ 1 is given by
U i = θi(−u2t+1) + (1− θ
i)r − δiθiτt+1 (2)
with the exogenous parameter θi, θi ∈ [0, 1], capturing the importance of the partisan goal
relative to the opportunistic goal of receiving the ego rent r. δi is the incumbent’s preference
for taxation. Our model implies that ALMP is (at least partly) able to lower unemployment
- and not only to lower the official unemployment rate.3 Solving the utility maximization
problem, we end up with
bi∗t+1 =
un
β
−
δi
2β2
. (3)
With respect to incumbent’s partisan orientation, we assume the rightwing politician to
be more averse against levying taxes than the leftwing politician (δR > δL) which appears
to be in line with empirical evidence.4 Since
∂b∗t+1
∂δi
< 0 holds, leftist incumbents have higher
budget deficits than rightwing incumbents (bL∗t+1 > b
R∗
t+1).
Given the politicians’ strategies described in (3), the expected utility of the incumbent
in period t amounts to
E(U i) =− θiu2t + (1− θ
i)r − δiθi
E(τt+1)
1 + i
+ p(ut(bt))
[
−θi(ui∗t+1)
2 + (1− θi)r
]
+ (1− p(ut(bt)))
[
−θi(uo∗t+1)
2
] (4)
with expected period t+ 1 taxes E(τt+1) = bt(1 + i) + p(ut(bt))b
i∗
t+1 + (1− p(ut(bt)))b
o∗
t+1, op-
timal unemployment rates ui∗t+1 (u
o∗
t+1) in case of the incumbent’s re-election (the opponent’s
victory) and no ego rent (r = 0) if the incumbent is not re-elected. Using (1) and (3), the
optimal level of ALMP expenditures for incumbent i is given by
bi∗t =
un
β
−
δi
2β2
+
∂p
∂ut
∂ut
∂bt
1
2β2
[
(δo − δi)2
4β2
+
1− θi
θi
r
]
. (5)
3Although empirical evidence discussed in the introduction suggests that a reasonable share of ALMP
does not have a sustainable effect, some measures indeed do have positive effects (see Fertig et al. 2006, for
a discussion on the macroeconomic impact of ALMP). The current call for more evaluation studies made by
many economists would not be reasonable if it was ex-ante clear that all measures are useless at all.
4E.g., empirical studies show that taxes were higher under leftwing governments (e.g., Garrett 1998,
Allers et al. 2001, Reed 2006).
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If the ego rent is non-negative, r ≥ 0, the budget deficit is always higher in election pe-
riods than in non-election periods (bi∗t > b
i∗
t+1). The positive effect of bt on the re-election
probability gives rise to a higher level of ALMP in election periods.
Hence, in our model a political business cycle occurs due to systematic deviations in
ALMP which depend on the incumbent’s partisan orientation and on the timing of the
election. ALMP expenditures are expected to be higher for leftwing than for rightwing
governments and higher in election years than in non-election years.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Institutional background
3.1.1 Active labor market policies in Germany
Active labor market policies are supposed to reintegrate unemployed persons into the labor
market by, for example, subsidising wages or by means of job-creation schemes.5 The ALMP
programs, in Germany supervised by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fuer
Arbeit, FEA) are intended to help overcome the unemployment problem. Historically, the
ALMP programs were one of the most important innovations of the Job Promotion Act
(AFG, Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz), which formed the legal basis for labor market policies in
Germany in the period 1969 to 1997. In 1998, the Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch, SGB) III
was adopted with the intention that ALMP should be further intensified.
ALMP does not only play a role at the federal level, however.6 In practice, it is not
only the FEA that implements ALMP, but above all, the Laender Employment Agencies
(Landesanstalten, LEA) (for further details on labor market policies in Germany and the
institutional set-up of job-creation schemes see, e.g., Thomsen 2007, p. 16).
In fact, the states’ governments can implement their preferred labor market policies not
only by subsidizing particular ALMPs with money from their own budgets, but also by
setting administrative guidelines in the LEAs. Political decision makers and high ranking
civil servants in the LEAs strongly cooperate. Politicians may also place friendly party
members in responsible positions in the LEAs.7 Besides the programs initiated by the LEAs
5There are several ALMP instruments which broadly remained the same but were extended over time.
Thomsen (2007) refers to the SGB III as a legal basis and distinguishes between “Measures to Enhance
and Adjust the Qualification of the Individuals”, “Counselling and Assistance for Regional and Vocational
Mobility”, and “Subsidised Employment”. The latter category consists of wage subsidies and two groups of
employment programs, namely job-creation schemes and structural adjustment schemes. They both establish
the so-called second labor market.
6For example, during the federal election campaigns for the Bundestag in 1994 and 1998 the chancellor
Helmut Kohl used ALMP measures to fight unemployment to a notable extent.
7Local authorities also play an important role in ALMP because they arrange new jobs, find positions
for unemployed persons and locally negotiate with the so called “Traeger”, but they are not responsible for
the budget decisions.
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and the local agencies, each state government can implement additional ALMP measures.
The trade-off between unemployment and budget deficit portrayed in our model is, therefore,
based on real circumstances: for any given level of local or LEA activity, a states’ government
can implement additional ALMP measures.
ALMP programs started in the beginning of the 1980s in the former West German states.
Our analysis focuses on this group of 10 states. In particular, we will examine job-creation
schemes until 2004 for two reasons: (1) job-creation schemes were a prominent policy instru-
ment and they became less important after the end of 2004, and (2) job-creation schemes are
the ALMP measure for which the best and most comparable data is available in Germany.
We do not include later years because of structural reforms of the German labor market by
the so-called Hartz-laws, which were introduced in 2005. Data on ALMP spending are not
available.
3.1.2 Parties, government coalitions, legislative periods and elections
Two major political parties have dominated the political spectrum in Germany: the leftist
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU).
In Bavaria, Germany’s largest federal state by area, the conservatives are not represented by
the CDU but by their sister party, the Christian Social Party (CSU). CDU and CSU do not
compete and they form a single faction in the federal parliament (Bundestag). This is why we
use the label CDU for both parties in the empirical analysis. All federal chancellors and state
prime ministers were members of one of these two major blocks, SPD and CDU. Therefore,
one can test for ideology-induced effects on this left-right dimension. The much smaller Free
Democratic Party (FDP) and Green party (GR) have played an important role as coalition
partners in the former Western states. While the SPD has formed coalitions with all the
other three parties, the CDU never formed a coalition with the Greens on the federal or state
level during the period analyzed in this paper. We will also consider the influence of the
different coalition types, because the left-right dimension may neglect ideological differences
between government parties within a “camp” (e.g. for the Left between SPD/FDP and
SPD/GR coalitions). As minority governments and other government formations have played
a negligible role, they will be subsumed under the coalition types mentioned above.
There are no fixed election dates across the German states and the legislative periods last
4 or 5 years. However, early elections may be called. So far, less than 10% of the elections
in the German states were early elections. We address the early election issue below.
3.2 Data and empirical strategy
3.2.1 Data and variables
We employ monthly data for the number of individuals treated in job-creation schemes
provided by Germany’s Federal Employment Office. The data covers the period 1985:1 to
2004:11 (levels) for the ten former West German states. We do not include the former East
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German states and also do not consider Berlin because it was divided before the German
unification and therefore the data contain a structural break.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the number of individuals in job-creation schemes and the
number of unemployed persons from 1985:1 to 2004:11. The number of individuals in job-
creation schemes and unemployment is subject to a seasonal pattern. Unemployment is
higher in winter than in summer, whereas the cyclical pattern of the job-creation schemes
is time-delayed. There are also differences in time and between the individual states. For
example, unemployment as well as the number of job-creation schemes decreased at the end
of the 1980s and reached a minimum after the German unification in 1990. Subsequently,
both increased steadily in almost all German states. Overall, we control for these effects
using fixed year, monthly, and state dummies in the econometric model.
Further structural economic variables are not available on a monthly basis, so that an
exact scaling of the job-creation schemes and unemployment is not possible. However, re-
ferring to annual population data in the states, the ratio of unemployed persons to total
population was, on average, about 4.1%, with a minimum of 1.5% and a maximum of 8.8%.
Regarding the relationship between the number of individuals in job-creation schemes and
the number of unemployed persons, there was, on average, approximately one job creation
scheme per 30 unemployed persons, with a minimum of one job-creation scheme per 400 and
a maximum of one per seven unemployed persons.
3.2.2 The empirical model
The basic econometric panel data model has the following form:
∆ln individuals in job-creation schemesiym =α1 Electioniym + α2 Post-Electioniym
+
∑
j
βj Ideologyijym + λm + γy + ηi + uiym
(6)
with i = 1, ..., 10; j = 1, ..., 6 (or j = 1, 2); m = 1, ..., 12; y = 1985, ..., 2004.
The dependent variable ∆ln individuals in job-creation schemesiym denotes the growth
rate in the number of individuals treated in job-creation schemes in every individual state.8
Panel unit root tests show that this variable is stationary. Moreover, λm describes fixed
monthly, γy fixed year
9, and ηi fixed state effects.
10 The number of j depends on the
specification.
Electioniym, Post-Electioniym, and
∑
j Ideologyijym describe the political variables on
which this study focuses on. First, the variable Election(12) captures the timing of the
elections. It assumes the value of one in the twelve months before an election and zero
8We use the number of individuals in job-creation schemes instead of the inflows into job-creation schemes
as the measures vary in duration.
9The fixed year effects also control for specific historical events such as the German unification.
10We exclude one of the fixed effect variables, respectively, in order to avoid multicollinearity problems.
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otherwise. We use this electoral variable as a benchmark. For robustness checks, we also
apply different codings such as ten and eight months before the elections.
The differences between leftist and rightwing governments will be tested on the left-right
scale using the variable ”Left” as well as different coalition type dummies, respectively.
The dummy ”Left” takes on the value of one in periods when a SPD Prime Minister was
in office (excluding grand coalitions) and zero otherwise. In the alternative specification,
the coalition type dummies take on the value of one when the specified coalition type was
in power and zero otherwise. We distinguish between six different coalition types: CDU,
CDU/FDP, CDU/SPD, SPD/FDP, SPD/GR, and SPD. With respect to the grand coalitions
(CDU/SPD), we do not distinguish which of the two parties appointed the Prime Minister.
To avoid multicollinearity between the coalition type dummies, one of the coalition type
dummies must function as the reference category (here SPD). The estimated effects of the
other coalition type dummies then need to be interpreted as deviations from the reference
category. In fact, regressing the growth rate of the ALMP measure on the government
ideology dummies implies that leftist and rightwing governments implement their preferred
policies incrementally.11 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
The basic model is initially estimated by feasible generalized least squares in a common
fixed effects framework. In addition, we apply heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent
(HAC) Newey-West type standard errors and variance-covariance estimates (Newey and
West 1987, Stock and Watson 2008), because the Wooldridge test for serial correlation in
the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model implies the existence of strong arbitrary
serial correlation (Wooldridge 2002, p. 176-177). The number of individuals in job-creation
schemes is directly related to the number of unemployed persons. Therefore, we include the
lagged number of unemployed persons in a further step since job-creation schemes are used in
reaction to high unemployment. We address the persistence and remaining seasonality of the
dependent variable and the time-delayed interaction of unemployed persons and job-creation
schemes by including a battery of lagged dependent variables and lags of the unemployment
variable. We also aggregate the monthly data to annual data and include further economic
control variables that are only available on an annual basis.
3.3 Estimation results
Table 2 shows the regression results of the base-line model with monthly data. In columns
(1) and (2) we have only included the political variables. In columns (3) and (4) we have
included a battery of lags of the dependent variable and the number of unemployed persons
(24 additional variables are included: lag 1−12 of the dependent variable and the number of
unemployed persons respectively). In a dynamic estimation with lagged dependent variables,
the common fixed-effect estimator is biased by 1/T (Nickell-bias). In our case with T bigger
11This is a significant point because politicians implement their preferred policies step by step during the
legislative periods. Therefore, it would not be reasonable to regress the growth rates of the ALMP measure
on the growth rates of the government ideology dummies.
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than 200 the Nickell-bias can be ignored. GMM-estimators are also biased for small N, so
that we do not apply them with N = 10. Columns (5) and (6) refer to regressions in which
we have excluded lagged variables that lack statistical significance. The first lag remains as
statistically significant at the 1% level and the coefficient reveals an elasticity of about 0.4.
The four months lagged number of unemployment persons just fails statistical significance
at the 10% level. In any event, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables and the
lagged number of unemployed persons does not affect our inferences regarding the political
variables at all.
In accordance with our theoretical model, politicians increased the growth rate of the
number of individuals in job-creation schemes in election years. The coefficient of the election
variable tells us that before elections in the German states, the growth rate of the job-creation
schemes increased by about 0.4% per month. The coefficient of the election year variable
is statistically significant at the 10% level in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) and at the 5%
level in columns (3) and (4). In contrast, the post-election variable does not turn out to be
statistically significant in columns (1) to (6). Thus, politicians behaved opportunistically.
The results do not, however, support the hypothesis that leftist governments implemented
more ALMP than rightwing governments. The coefficients of the ideology variables mostly
do have the expected signs but do not turn out to be statistically significant. An exception
is the CDU/SPD dummy variable which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The
coefficients suggest that the growth rate of job-creation schemes under CDU/SPD (grand
coalition) governments was about 0.3% higher than under pure SPD governments.
Elections can be irregular (early) (Brender and Drazen 2005, Shi and Svensson 2006).
Following Shi and Svensson’s (2006, p. 1374) identification strategy an election is classified
as predetermined (regular) if either (i) the election is held on the fixed date (year) specified
by the constitution; or (ii) the election is held in the last year of a constitutionally fixed
term; or (iii) the election is announced at least a year in advance. In our sample, 8% of the
state elections need to be classified as early. We have replaced the election year variable by
a variable for regular and an early election variable. The regular election-year variables are
statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1), (2), and (4) in Table 3 and at the 10%
level in column (3). The early election-year variables do not turn out to be statistically sig-
nificant. These findings again indicate that politicians behaved opportunistically to become
re-elected.
Federal elections may also influence ALMP in the German states. The reason is twofold:
(1) the federal governments also implement some job-creation schemes and (2) the chancellor
can encourage the prime ministers in the states (governors) that belong to his party to boost
ALMP effort in order increase his re-election chances at the federal level. We have therefore
included a federal election dummy that takes on the value one in the twelve months before
a federal election and is zero otherwise. Table 4 shows that the federal election dummy is
statistically significant at the 1% level. The numerical meaning is significant: the coefficient
of the federal election dummy is about three times as big as the coefficient of the state
election dummy variable. Notice that including the federal election dummy does not change
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the estimated value and the statistical significance of the state election dummy.
We have replaced the base-line election dummy variables (which assume the value 1 in
the 12 months preceeding an election) by election dummy variables that assume the value
one in the ten and eight months before the election (and zero otherwise). Inferences do not
change.
We checked for the sensitivity of the results to individual states. To rule out this possibil-
ity, we performed the regressions again, excluding one state at a time. Overall, the inferences
are robust in that they are not subject to the inclusion of particular states. The influence
of the election variables declines, however, when Schleswig-Holstein and the Saarland are
excluded.
Other economic variables capturing the industry and employment structure and the fiscal
equalization scheme may influence ALMP in the German states. We therefore controlled for
these influences. Data on the industry and employment structure and the fiscal equalization
scheme are, however, only available at an annual level. We therefore aggregated our monthly
data to yearly data. The results in Table 5 show that employing annual data also points
to an electoral cycle in ALMP. We included an election year dummy variable that takes on
the value one in election years and is zero otherwise. The post-election year variable takes
on the value one in post-election years and is zero otherwise. The election year variable
is statistically significant at the 5% level in column (1). The numerical meaning of the
coefficient of the election year variable is that the growth rate of the number of individuals
in job-creation schemes increased by about 4% in election years. By contrast, the post-
election year variable does not turn out to be statistically significant. In columns (2), the
election year variable lacks statistical significance at conventional level. The variable ”Left”
has a positive sign but does not turn out to be statistically significant (column 1). Only
the CDU/SPD coalition type dummy turns out to be statistically significant at the 10%
level. The results in column (3) and (4) refer to regressions in which we employed Bruno’s
(2005a, 2005b) dynamic bias corrected estimator.12 The lagged dependent variable does not
turn out to be statistically significant in columns (3) and (4). The lagged growth rate of
the unemployment rate is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (2) and (4) and
at the 1% level in columns (1) and (3) and has the expected positive sign. The inferences
12We have mentioned above that in the context of dynamic estimation, the common fixed-effect estimator
is biased by 1/T. As T is significantly smaller with annual data, we need to correct for the bias now. The
estimators that take into account the resulting bias can be broadly grouped into a class of instrumental
estimators and a class of direct bias corrected estimators (see Behr 2003, for example, for a discussion). In
accordance with large sample properties of the GMM methods, e.g., the estimator proposed by Arellano and
Bond (1991) will be biased in our econometric model with N=10. For this reason, bias corrected estimators
are more appropriate. Bruno (2005a, 2005b) presents a bias corrected least squares dummy variable estimator
for dynamic panel data models with small N which we apply. We choose the Blundell-Bond (1998) estimator
as the initial estimator in which the instruments are collapsed as suggested by Roodman (2006). This
procedure makes sure to avoid using invalid and too many instruments (see Roodman 2006 and 2009 for
further details). Following Bloom et al. (2007) we undertake 50 repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap
the estimated standard errors.
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regarding the election variables do not change; the CDU/SPD coalition type dummy does
not turn out to be statistically significant in column (4).
Table 6 shows the results when industry and employment structure and the fiscal equal-
ization scheme variables are included. We employ data by the German Federal Statistical
Office on the number of firms and the number of employees in these firms in the manufactur-
ing sector. The fiscal equalization variable captures the horizontal fiscal equalization system
and equals the real amount of money which the individual state received (positive amount)
or spent (negative amount) in period t. Neither the number of firms, nor the number of
employees, nor the fiscal equalization variable turn out to be statistically significant. In
any event, including these variables does not change the inferences regarding the political
variables at all.
4 Conclusion
Electoral motives and government ideology can explain why governments all over Europe
have implemented so many ALMP programs and spent so much money on these programs.
Our theoretical model combines politicians’ opportunistic and partisan behavior and predicts
that (1) politicians will increase spending on ALMP before elections irrespective of their party
ideology and (2) leftwing politicians will spend more on ALMP than rightwing politicians.
We have tested these predictions using data for the German states from 1985:1 to 2004:11
and find that ALMP in the form of job-creation schemes were pushed before elections.
Our model and the empirical findings have important implications for labor economics
as well as political economy. The predictions of our model can be tested for other European
countries in which the effectiveness of ALMP programs have been controversial. Empirical
studies could also employ other ALMP measures than job-creation schemes. Avenues for
future research include the following questions: have electoral motives and government ide-
ology influenced training programs and wage subsidies to the same extent? Are some ALMP
measures more prone to strategic considerations before elections? If yes: can these effects
explain why some AMLP programs turn out to be less effective than others? Is the influence
of electoral motives and government ideology on ALMP different in East and West European
countries?13
An important question for future research is whether expansionary policies (ALMP as
well as other economic policies) before elections indeed improve the incumbent’s re-election
prospects. Our results suggest that political cycles in ALMP occur but we cannot draw any
conclusions on the actual importance of expansionary ALMP for re-election purposes. When
opportunistic behavior pays, politicians may well proceed boosting the economy in order to
stay in office.
13By employing OECD panel data, the results by Goerke et al. (2010) suggest that leftwing governments
increased unemploymend benefits. Leftwing governments did not, however, increase the growth rate of
ALMP spending in OECD countries (Potrafke 2010).
12
The influence of electoral motives and government ideology on economic policy-making
has often been investigated separately. The reason is that the political business cycle (PBC)
and the partisan politics (PT) hypotheses are complementary. Only some attempts have
been made in order to combine elements of the PBC and PT theories (Frey and Schneider
1978a and 1978b, Sieg 2006). Our model acknowledges that politicians may implement
ideology-induced economic policies and also behave opportunistically. Leftwing politicians
are expected to have more expansionary policies than rightwing politicians. Both leftwing
and rightwing politicians will, however, boost economic activities before elections in order
to become re-elected. Our model can therefore be used as theoretical background for future
empirical studies that examine the influence of electoral motives and government ideology
on economic policy-making.
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5 Appendix
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Figure 1: Individual’s voting decision.
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Figure 2: Number of individuals in job-creation schemes in the West German states in the
period from 1984:12 to 2004:11. Source: German Federal Employment Office
15
Figure 3: Number of unemployed persons in the West German states in the period from
1984:12 to 2004:11. Source: German Federal Employment Office
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Monthly data
Job-Creation Schemes 2390 6326.23 6440.11 172 30711 Federal Employment Agency
Unemployed Persons 2390 231364.5 211696.9 33679 921330 Federal Employment Agency
Election (12) 2390 0.24 0.43 0 1 own calculation
Post-Election (12) 2390 0.24 0.43 0 1 own calculation
Regular Election (12) 2390 0.22 0.41 0 1 own calculation
Early Election (12) 2390 0.02 0.13 0 1 own calculation
Federal Election (12) 2390 0.25 0.43 0 1 own calculation
Left 2231 0.62 0.49 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
SPD 2390 0.34 0.47 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
SPD/FDP 2390 0.11 0.31 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
SPD/GR 2390 0.13 0.34 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
CDU/SPD 2390 0.07 0.25 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
CDU/FDP 2390 0.15 0.36 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
CDU 2390 0.20 0.40 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
Annual data
Job-Creation Schemes 200 6308.09 6401.36 236.27 29536.92 Federal Employment Agency
Unemployment Rate 200 9.58 2.68 3.73 16.78 Federal Employment Agency
Election (12) 200 0.25 0.43 0 1 own calculation
Post-Election (12) 200 0.24 0.43 0 1 own calculation
Regular Election (12) 200 0.23 0.42 0 1 own calculation
Early Election (12) 200 0.02 0.14 0 1 own calculation
Federal Election (12) 200 0.25 0.43 0 1 own calculation
Left 186 0.62 0.49 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
SPD 200 0.29 0.45 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
SPD/FDP 200 0.11 0.31 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
SPD/GR 200 0.19 0.39 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
CDU/SPD 200 0.07 0.26 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
CDU/FDP 200 0.16 0.37 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
CDU 200 0.19 0.39 0 1 Potrafke (2011)
Firms 200 4210.855 3799.453 331 11905 Federal Statistical Office
Employees in Firms 200 627775.1 579617.1 60608 2037956 Federal Statistical Office
Fiscal equalization 200 -52.115 1009.377 -2734.389 1889.04 Federal Statistical Office
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0045* 0.0043* 0.0041** 0.0039** 0.0029* 0.0027*
(1.98) (1.88) (2.41) (2.28) (1.94) (1.85)
Post-Election (12) 0.0016 0.0007 0.0019 0.0009 0.0011 0.0005
(0.93) (0.36) (1.19) (0.49) (0.92) (0.37)
Left 0.0013 0.0021 0.0015
(0.85) (1.50) (1.63)
SPD/FDP 0.0008 0.0011 0.0004
(0.63) (0.98) (0.45)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.003 0.0022 0.0016
(1.68) (1.64) (1.41)
CDU/SPD 0.0041*** 0.0027** 0.0020**
(4.55) (2.64) (2.58)
CDU/FDP -3x10−5 -0.0011 -0.0006
(0.02) (1.04) (0.81)
CDU 0.0001 -0.001 0.0001
(0.02) (0.34) (0.02)
Lags Dependent Variable Lag
1.-12.
Lag
1.-12.
Lags Unemployed Persons Lag
1.-12.
Lag
1.-12.
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.3944*** 0.3967***
(10.99) (11.29)
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t − 4) 0.0434 0.0428
(1.68) (1.63)
Fixed State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2221 2380 2120 2279 2200 2359
Number of N 10 10 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.22 0.20 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.33
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Regression results. Dependent variable: Growth rate of the number of individuals
in job-creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen), 1985:1-2004:11. Heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. Lags included.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Regular Election (12) 0.0046** 0.0046** 0.0029* 0.0029**
(2.36) (2.38) (2.23) (2.31)
Early Election (12) -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0023 -0.0023
(0.57) (0.53) (0.60) (0.60)
Left 0.0007 0.0011
(0.40) (0.99)
SPD/FDP 0.0009 0.0004
(0.73) (0.50)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.0028 0.0014
(1.54) (1.25)
CDU/SPD 0.0043*** 0.0022**
(4.79) (2.80)
CDU/FDP 0.0004 -0.0003
(0.27) (0.31)
CDU 0.0005 -0.0006
(0.14) (0.31)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.3943*** 0.3963***
(10.70) (11.07)
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t− 4) 0.0426 0.0423
(1.67) (1.62)
Fixed State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2221 2380 2200 2359
Number of N 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.22 0.20 0.34 0.33
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Regression results. Dependent variable: Growth rate of the number of individuals in
job-creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. Monthly data. Regular and early
elections.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0045* 0.0043* 0.0029* 0.0028*
(2.02) (1.95) (1.98) (1.94)
Post-Election (12) 0.0015 0.0006 0.0011 0.0005
(0.81) (0.33) (0.82) (0.34)
Federal Election (12) 0.0123*** 0.0132*** 0.0089*** 0.0099***
(4.09) (5.77) (4.24) (6.51)
Left 0.0013 0.0015
(0.91) (1.71)
SPD/FDP 0.0007 0.0003
(0.56) (0.38)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.0029 0.0015
(1.58) (1.31)
CDU/SPD 0.004*** 0.002**
(4.42) (2.50)
CDU/FDP -0.0002 -0.0008
(0.20) (1.04)
CDU -1x10−5 -0.0001
(0.00) (0.53)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.3872*** 0.3887***
(11.18) (11.48)
∆ ln Unemployed Persons (t− 4) 0.0433 0.0427
(1.67) (1.61)
Fixed State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Monthly Effects (Seasonality) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2221 2380 2200 2359
Number of N 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.22 0.20 0.34 0.33
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Regression results. Dependent variable: Growth rate of the number of individuals
in job-creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen). Heteroskedastic and autocorrela-
tion consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors. Monthly data. Federal elections
considered.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0439** 0.0394* 0.0459** 0.0427*
(2.62) (1.94) (2.14) (1.85)
Post-Election (12) 0.0221 0.0032 0.0162 -0.0021
(0.71) (0.10) (0.60) (0.08)
Left 0.0165 0.0282
(0.37) (0.71)
SPD/FDP 0.0423 0.0333
(1.22) (0.61)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.0281 0.0231
(0.71) (0.62)
CDU/SPD 0.0708* 0.0473
(1.85) (0.66)
CDU/FDP 0.0215 0.0066
(0.57) (0.14)
CDU -0.0401 -0.0648
(0.54) (1.11)
∆ ln Unemployment Rate (t − 1) 0.7952*** 0.5659* 0.874*** 0.623**
(3.36) (2.22) (2.62) (2.22)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.1413* 0.1247
(1.84) (1.56)
Fixed State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176 190 166 180
Number of N 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.73 0.73
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Regression results. Dependent variable: Growth rate of the number of individuals in
job-creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors and dynamic bias corrected estimator.
Annual data.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
FGLS FGLS FGLS FGLS
Election (12) 0.0366* 0.0308 0.0386* 0.0339
(2.08) (1.65) (1.68) (1.43)
Post-Election (12) 0.0163 -0.003 0.0118 -0.0072
(0.54) (0.09) (0.42) (0.29)
Left 0.0207 0.0306
(0.43) (0.77)
SPD/FDP 0.0511 0.0412
(1.44) (0.75)
SPD/Gru¨ne 0.0363 0.0326
(0.86) (0.80)
CDU/SPD 0.0964 0.068
(1.81) (0.86)
CDU/FDP 0.0201 0.0079
(0.49) (0.17)
CDU -0.0309 -0.0577
(0.42) (1.00)
∆ ln Unemployment Rate (t − 1) 0.852*** 0.659** 0.9361*** 0.7087**
(3.31) (2.47) (2.79) (2.42)
∆ ln Firms 0.6548 0.8095 0.6773 0.822
(0.91) (1.34) (0.88) (0.95)
∆ ln Employees in Firms 0.4204 0.8015 0.3264 0.7145
(0.40) (0.99) (0.24) (0.55)
Fiscal Equalization -2x10−5 -2x10−5 -2x10−5 -1x10−5
(0.91) (0.74) (0.51) (0.41)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.1211 0.0968
(1.55) (1.19)
Fixed State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176 190 166 180
Number of N 10 10 10 10
R-Squared (overall) 0.73 0.73
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Regression results. Dependent variable: Growth rate of the number of individuals in
job-creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors and dynamic bias corrected estimator.
Annual data.
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